Introduction
During the last twenty years the world has experienced a sharp rise in the number of international courts and tribunals, and the correlative expansion of their jurisdictions.
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There is little question that these occurrences have dramatically affected (and will continue to affect) the fields of both international law and international relations. At the international level, the constitution and existence of judicial bodies which are capable of enforcing international commitments, interpreting international treaties and settling international conflicts has facilitated the growth of legal norms and cooperative regimes, which nowadays govern important areas of international law and politics, such as economic relations, human rights and armed conflict. International courts (understood in this article as independent judicial bodies, created by an international instrument, and invested with the authority to apply international law to  The research presented hereby is the first product of the work of a research group on measuring the effectiveness of international courts directed by the author and funded by the European Research Council. Puzzle', (1999) 31 N.Y.U. J. INT'l L. & Pol. 709. that compliance may be a poor proxy of judicial effectiveness if viewed in detachment from the nature of the commitments undertaken by the relevant state parties. 9 The rapidly increasing range of legal literature discussing the effectiveness of international courts contains many important insights as to the factors which could explain increased or decreased court effectiveness. This literature also presents, at times, interesting empirical data to sustain claims of judicial effectiveness or ineffectiveness. 10 Nevertheless, a significant portion of this literature possesses an 'Achilles heel', to be found in the crude and/or intuitive definitions of "effectiveness" that are employed, which often equate effectiveness with compliance with court
judgments. Yet, complicated links exist between compliance with judicial decisions and effectiveness: 11 Compliance rates may depend as much on the nature of the remedies issued by a court as on the perceived quality of the court's organs or procedures. Thus, a "low-aiming" court, which issues minimalist remedies, may generate high levels of compliance, yet have a little impact on the state of the world.
12
Although compliance with the underlying legal norms may be a more appropriate approach to understanding judicial effectiveness, 13 isolating the contribution of judicial processes to long-term compliance with legal norms could be extremely challenging.
14 As a result it may remain unclear how and to what extent international courts promote norm-compliance. Moreover, identifying effectiveness with normcompliance may stand in tension with some other goals assumed by international 9 See Helfer and Slaughter, supra note 8, at 918. 10 See e.g., Posner and Yoo, supra note 6, at 7; Ku and Nzelibe, supra note 5, at 780. 11 For a comparable discussion of the relationship between compliance and effectiveness, see Harold K. Jacobson and Edith Brown-Weiss, 'A Framework of Analysis' in ENGAGING COUNTRIES: STRENGTHENING COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL ACCORDS. 1, at 5 (Edith Brown Weiss and Harold K Jacobson eds., 2000), (-Countries may be in compliance with a treaty, but the treaty may nevertheless be ineffective in attaining its objectives‖). 12 See e.g., Guzman, supra note 5, at 187. Guzman similarly criticizes reliance on -usage rates‖ as a proxy for compliance, noting that it ignores the -shadow effect‖ of courts, which results in cases being settled out-of-court instead of being litigated. See also Jacobson and Brown-Weiss, supra note 11, at 188. 13 See Jacobson and Brown-Weiss, supra note 11, at 188. 14 For a discussion of some of the limits of compliance data, see George Downs, David M. Rocke and Peter N. Barsoom, ‗Is the Good News about Compliance Good News about Cooperation? ', (1996) 50 International Organization 379, at 383.
courts: Dispute resolution may at times involve settlements that deviate from existing law, for example. 15 Insisting on compliance with the legal status quo ex ante as a measure of effectiveness may thus fail to capture a court's dispute settling or lawdevelopment role. 16 As a result, a better understanding of the concept of international court effectiveness, which exceeds the notion of compliance-inducement, is arguably warranted.
The methodological problems stemming from the lack of a clear definition of effectiveness in some of the relevant literature are further compounded by general assumptions employed by certain writers about the role of international courts in the life of the international community, which seem to transpose the role that courts play in national legal systems onto the international realm. 17 The combination of an
underdeveloped understanding of what ought to constitute effective international courts and the theoretical and practical difficulties associated with actually measuring such criteria, may lead to unsatisfying results and to misunderstandings about the effectiveness of international courts.
Yet, methodological problems similar, by and large, to the ones mentioned above have attracted considerable attention over a long period of time in the social science literature. In this academic discipline, one may find a vast body of studies dealing 15 See e.g., Gabçikovo-Nagymaros (Hungary v. Slovakia) 1997 ICJ Rep. 7, 78, (September 25) . (-the Parties together should look afresh at the effects on the environment of the operation of the Gabçikovo power plant. In particular they must find a satisfactory solution for the volume of water to be released into the old bed of the Danube and into the side-arms on both sides of the river. It is not for the Court to determine what shall be the final result of these negotiations to be conducted by the Parties. It is for the Parties themselves to find an agreed solution‖). 16 The present article surveys some key notions used in social science literature relating to the methodology for measuring the effectiveness of public organizations and discusses their possible application to international courts. In doing so, I hope to contribute to the establishment of a more sophisticated analytical framework for discussing international court effectiveness than those which are offered in the existing international law literature. In Part One, I discuss the notion of "organizational effectiveness" and explain the choice of a goal-based definition of effectiveness as the most suitable approach for evaluating international courts. I then survey a number of ways to classify organizational goals and illustrate some of the difficulties and ambiguities that measuring effectiveness on the basis of goalattainment may nonetheless entail. In Part Two, I introduce some key methodological moves used by the social science literature in order to measure institutional effectiveness after the goals of the organization have been identified. Such moves include the fleshing out of different operational categories relating to the evaluated organization's structure, process and outcome. In Part Three, I discuss how the methods of analysis developed in the social science literature could be applied to the study of international courts, given the unique attributes and context for their operation, and suggest some elements that should be integrated into future research seeking to develop a suitable research methodology.
To be clear, the present article does not attempt to offer any conclusions as to whether international courts in general, or any specific international court in particular, are "effective". Nor does it take a position on the question whether the international community actually is, or should be, interested in developing more effective international courts -a question that relates, inter alia, to the -balance of power‖ between states and institutions of international governance and among the latter institutions. 18 My main interest in this article is, instead, to develop a research agenda that could advance an inter-disciplinary approach towards addressing the question of international court effectiveness. The proposed framework could lay the foundations for future analytical and empirical work that would be more specific in its focus (e.g., focusing on specific goals or on a specific court). Indeed, the present researcher currently coordinates a number of specific research projects by junior researchers that seek to apply in specific contexts the general framework proposed herein.
Part One: What Constitutes Organizational "Effectiveness"?
Whether it is intended to appraise organizational performance, or affect organizational design or procedures, 19 a key conceptual hurdle that any research into organizational effectiveness has to address is what constitutes an "effective organization", or in other words, what does one consider "organizational effectiveness" to be. Although some argue that there may be as many models of effectiveness as there are studies of organizational effectiveness, 20 the dominant definition of effectiveness in the social science literature appears to be based on the "rational system approach", which offers a rather straight forward formulation: "an action is effective if it accomplishes its specific objective aim." 21 Of course, this performance-standard normally has to be assessed over predefined units of time. Consequently, in order to measure the effectiveness of an organization according to the "rational system approach", one has to identify the organization's aims or goals 22 -i.e., the desired outcomes it ought to generate, and ascertain the time frame over which some or all of these goals can reasonably be expected to be met.
23
Significantly, under the "rational system approach", the desirability of the goals themselves is not questioned (the capacity to attain them can, however, be doubted).
Hence, the project of assessing effectiveness pursuant to this approach is predominantly descriptive and analytical. 24 Still, as is shown below, normative considerations cannot be divorced altogether from an analysis of judicial performance. 25 Moreover, the underlying premise of this -rational system‖ approach, and of the present research -i.e., that organizations need to meet their goals and faithfully execute their mandate, contains an implicit normative statement about the desirability of organizational conduct in general, and about the proper conduct of international courts in particular.
What Types of Goals Exist?
Charles Perrow, an influential organization studies theorist, distinguishes between the "official goals" and the "operative goals" of the evaluated organization in his writings on organizational effectiveness. Another factor that may affect goal ambiguity is the age of the organization and changes made to its mandate over time (often in response to perceived successes and failures of the organization). Official mandates that are revised from time to time tend to become increasingly specific in a way that reduces operative goal ambiguity concerns. Still, the tendency to gradually "overburden" organizations with an projects, which may have generated better or worse consequences.
42
A comprehensive approach to assessing organizational effectiveness -especially one geared towards considering the reform of existing institutions -should arguably take into account such unforeseen (or underestimated) costs and benefits. The term "inefficiency" (as opposed to ineffectiveness) will be used here to describe unintended costs of this kind, whereas the term "efficiency" (as opposed to effectiveness) may be used to describe net benefits accrued independently of the organization's goals. 43 In addition, one may also measure the cost-effectiveness of the organization -i.e., the relationship between inputs and outputs -in order to form an opinion on its relative effectiveness and efficiency. 44 Second, we should be mindful of the distinction between goals and motives. The questions what should an organization achieve and why should it achieve which it sets 40 See e.g., Jacobson and Brown-Weiss, supra note 11, at 5 (noting that an antipollution treaty proscribing some pollutant may lead to the employment of even more polluting substitutes Netherlands; , at 45 ("Effectiveness makes clear whether that target is reached while ignoring the means that were used ").
out to, do not always fully overlap. This is particularly the case when relevant stakeholders that were involved in the process of creating the organization possessed interests which diverge from that of the organization itself (or from that of some of the other stakeholders). For example, a public organization may be created by Parliament as part of an agenda for shifting power away from one part of government to the other. Although the changes in the allocation of power can explain the reasons behind the creation of the organization (and perhaps also some of its structural attributes), these explanations are often not translated into a concrete set of expectations that the organization is required to meet throughout its ongoing operations, nor into the public justifications for its creation and continued existence.
Since goals tend to be more transparent, accessible and common to large numbers of stakeholders than motives (which may be hidden, unstated and idiosyncratic), it would seem preferable if a research into organizational effectiveness designed to provide a collective of public actors (the mandate providers) with evaluative tools would focus on goals as the primary yardstick for performance evaluation. The identification of the specific motives which led some mandate providers to support the establishment of the organization should serve, therefore, only as subsidiary means of ascertaining organizational goals.
Thirdly, one ought to carefully select the appropriate unit of time for measuring effectiveness. Different organizations may have distinct life cycles and fluctuations in their performance over time (which may be explained by a variety of internal and external factors). 45 Hence, selection of the measured time unit can have a crucial impact on the outcome of the goal-attainment assessment process. For example, including the first years of the organization's operations in the assessment -a period during which the organization invested in its long-term infrastructure and struggled with various "growing pains", may skew the findings of cost-effectiveness. In the same vein, examining performance in a single period of assessment which encompasses the organization's entire lifespan may obscure positive and negative trends in performance and goal-attainment. Still, an excessive focus on certain periods in the organization's life may also raise difficulties. Such a focus may, at times, overshadow the "bigger picture" of the organization's effectiveness, cost-effectiveness and efficiency; and it may also fail to accurately capture delayed outcomes, 
Other Definitions of Effectiveness
Although the "rational system approach" described above represents the most common approach towards the study of effectiveness that is applied in the social science literature, it is certainly not the only method of defining and studying effectiveness. Another approach, which may also be relevant for a research project seeking to better understand the value of the public goods generated by international courts, emphasizes the relationship between the organization and the environment with which it interacts (the "open systems approach"). 52 According to this approach, the effectiveness of the organization depends on the net benefits (or costs) that it generates for its social environment. An effective banking institution, for example, may be one that contributes to a prosperous economic climate, whilst an effective academic institution may be one that fosters the creation of intellectual groups within society. A specific application of the -open systems‖ approach can be found in the work of Oran Young that focuses on international institutions and define effectiveness as a -measure of the role of social institutions in shaping or molding behavior in international society‖. 53 In this context too, questions of individual and collective state compliance with applicable rules may also loom large in the analysis.
54
While the "open systems approach" is sensible and intuitive, its ability to offer meaningful benchmarks for performance evaluation appears to be more limited than the more specific goal-attainment analysis proposed by the -rational system approach‖. This is particularly the case when one is dealing with complex 50 L. Still, the "open systems approach" does lend support to the notion that the aforementioned indications of efficiency/inefficiency that reflect the organization's interaction with its environment are relevant (at some level) to a project designed to evaluate organizational effectiveness. Moreover, the "rational system" and "open system" approaches overlap to the degree that the goals of the public organizations are tied to their social environments: A governmental department entrusted with processing social security claims may be expected to increase social welfare across the relevant polity, for example; in such cases, the two approaches share similar problems of measurement.
Another approach to effectiveness developed in the social sciences literature regards the ultimate goal of organizations as that of obtaining sufficient resources to sustain their continued functioning, 56 or the exploitation of their environments for the acquisition of uncommon or valued resources (the "system resources approach").
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Although the "system resources approach", which is in some respects a derivative of the "open systems approach", can offer certain interesting insights on organizational performance, its definition of effectiveness appears unsuitable for a legal study such as the present one. This is because the present study of the effectiveness of international courts departs, as already noted, from a normative assumption about the potential importance of goal-attainment, and although, I do not plan to second-guess the desirability of the goals set by the mandate providers, such goals are likely to derive from a plausible conception of the public good. 
Identifying Operational Categories
When measuring organization effectiveness, the social sciences literature usually evaluates three distinct aspects of the organization's operations (sometimes referred to as "operational categories"), namely: Structure (or input), process and outcome.
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According to the "rational system approach", an examination of effectiveness should consider: whether the tangible and intangible resources available to the organization actually enable it to meet its objectives (structure); 65 whether the organizational process facilitates the aim of the organization (process); 66 and whether the outputs and their social effects are consistent with the organization's goals (outcome).
67
Only the third question is directly related to evaluating whether an organization actually meets its goals, or in other words, functions as an "effective" organization.
Measuring the impacts of public organizations however, may be extremely difficult (and some say, impossible). This is because the goals of public organizations tend to be ambiguous and the public goods they generate are hard to quantify (contrary to private organizations that tend to generate quantifiable profits or losses). controversial, since they involve aspects that relate to more than one operational category (for example, assessing whether an organization actually follows its procedures may be viewed as either an assessment of process or outcome).
As suggested above, an examination which focuses exclusively on the question of whether organizations meet their goals would too narrowly limit our perspective on the organizations' social utility. In order to form a more comprehensive assessment, one may further try to evaluate any unplanned or unforeseen benefits and costs associated with the organization's operation, and discuss the cost-effectiveness of the organization's outcomes. Indicators would need to be developed for the purpose of measuring these additional performance criteria as well. 
Multi-level Governance
One of the unique attributes of public organizations is the fact that they function within complex social environments, which generate strong dynamics that impact notaries and the functioning of the justice system); c) The National Center 
Part Three: Application to International Courts

Identifying the Goals of International Courts
Applying methods that measure the effectiveness of public organizations, which were developed in the social science literature to the evaluation of effectiveness of international courts, may provide us with new research possibilities in the field of international law and international institutions. Most significantly, the emphasis on organizational goals in assessing effectiveness requires us to invest considerable intellectual effort in identifying the specific goals of each international court from the vantage point of the relevant stakeholders. Such an approach invites an institutionspecific (and stakeholder-specific) analysis of effectiveness, as opposed to the "thick brush" approach used to describe the goals of international court in some of the relevant legal literature. The set of questions proposed below thus corresponds to the stated goals of the present research:
1 The Goals of International Courts
Firstly, it may be useful to try and identify the various external goals set for the relevant tribunal by its mandate-providers. Such goals include explicit and implicit official goals, as well as the more specific intermediate goals laid down by the mandate-providers in the court's constitutive instruments. Such external goals represent the gamut of expectations that the court's direct creators and/or primary funders and backers convey to the court in question. In political terms, these external goals may constitute a principal benchmark against which the court's record of achievement will actually be tested; and in normative terms, the proposition that 82 See in this regard the words of caution issued by Scott: "Researchers who attempt to assess the effectiveness of organizations are not immune to these political processes. Which and whose criteria we choose to emphasize in our studies of organizations will depend on our own interests in undertaking the study. We must be willing to state clearly what criteria we propose to employ, recognizing that whatever they are and whoever espouses them, they are always normative conceptions, serving some interests more than others, and likely to be both limited and controversial." -Scott, supra note 199, at 356.
courts should faithfully execute their mandates appears sound and legitimate. Finally, from a purely methodological point of view, external goals set by the mandateproviders also offer a relatively clear point of departure for studying the effectiveness of international courts.
The other distinctions discussed above, such as the distinction between official and operational goals, as well as between different levels of goal generality (i.e., ultimate ends v. strategic intermediate goals), are less suitable for a project designed to gauge the attainment of the mandate-providers' expectations than the aforementioned external/internal distinction. This is because, unlike the latter, the former distinctions do not isolate the mandate-providers as the principal goal-setting stakeholders and are thus less compatible with the goals of the present research. Still, such distinctions may be useful as subsidiary means for highlighting overlaps and conflicts between different organizational goals; in offering a normative context for understanding the relative importance of different goals; and in providing a critical perspective for actual prioritization decisions (operative goals).
Secondly, it is also useful to establish the operative internal goals identified by the courts themselves (judges, registrars, prosecutors, etc.). While courts are not the primary stakeholders whose expectations serve as the principal yardstick for measuring effectiveness under the present research framework, their direct involvement in shaping their structure, process and outcome, renders them a key player in facilitating or hindering the fulfillment of the goals set by the mandate providers. Hence, it could be helpful to identify such self-determined goals and to conduct a normative evaluation of whether such internal goals are compatible with the external goals set by the court's mandate-providers. It is expected that self-determined goals will tend to be more specific in contents, as well as more closely "tailored" to the capabilities and practical needs of the institution itself (creating programs aimed at increasing judicial output, for example) 83 than the external goals set by the mandate- institution would be required to meet). The greater proximity between goal-setters and goal-implementers and the greater specificity such a relationship entails may render internal goals more influential on actual court performance. This observation is attributed in part to the fact that specific operative goals may be more amenable to measurement and assessment than official goals. (Some normative assessment of the skewing effect of measurable operative goals on goal prioritization may be warranted). 84 In short, identifying and measuring the fulfillment of internal goals may ultimately help us identify and measure the attainment of external goals.
Finally, one should look at unstated goals -that is to say, goals which the court's official mandate or internal guidelines fail to establish, but which have subsequently been developed at either the mandate-providers or the court's own initiative (possibly in response to stakeholder expectations). Note that unstated goals differ from implicit goals, in that the latter can be derived by way of interpretation from the official or operative goals of the court. As noted before, unstated goals may often reflect what may be regarded as inherent goals -in our case, goals inherent to the operation of international courts, such as interpreting norms or legitimizing the exercise of governmental power. 85 At the same time, unstated goals may vary considerably from the court's stated goals and generate tensions between the original mandate-providers' expectations of the court and its actual policies.
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While identifying some unstated goals of international courts could be difficult or controversial (partly because individual judges may have idiosyncratic conceptions of the court's unstated goals, which are not shared by the bench as a whole), 87 
Measuring Outcomes
The key to assessing the effectiveness of international courts according to the "rational system approach" involves evaluation of judicial outcomes. While some outputs generated by international courts are relatively easy to capture (the number of 
Unintended/Unforeseen Costs and Benefits
As previously noted, international courts can also generate unexpected outcomes that represent certain social costs and/or benefits. Such costs and benefits affect the overall evaluation of the efficiency of international courts. Among the unexpected negative outcomes, one may identify both directly-related outcomes (such as jurisdictional conflicts between different international courts) 99 and indirectly related outcomes, such as the possible derailment of peace processes as a result of the refusal of international criminal courts to respect national amnesties. 100 In this regard, one can establish that the creation and operation of international courts had stymied the pursuit of other, more promising international efforts (if the creation of an international criminal court had served as a substitute for humanitarian intervention to prevent more crimes from occurring, for example), then the establishment of such courts may have actually generated a net cost.
At the same time, one should also look at unexpected direct and indirect benefits generated by the operation of international courts. Some direct outcomes (such as national capacity building through the transfer of expertise from international courts, 102 the development of an historical record of events, 103 and informal socialization between courts and other relevant actors) 104 may not have been part of the official or even operative goals of international courts. They could therefore be viewed as unintended benefits. Furthermore, some indirect beneficial outcomes may also be identified. The establishment of some international courts has inspired the subsequent creation of similar additional courts (for example, the ICTY and the ICTR were an underlying influence on the establishment of the ICC). 105 Furthermore, the fact that court adjudication raises the international profile of certain problems (such as WTO jurisprudence attracting attention to the relationship between trade and environment), 106 which thereby encourages international cooperation to resolve them, 107 may be viewed as an unexpected benefit that could compensate for certain sub-optimal features in the operation of the reviewed court.
As noted above, the willingness to factor in unexpected impacts of international courts enables us to develop a better informed and far more comprehensive assessment of their performance. This does introduce, however, additional methodological complications, which may not be fully amenable to solution.
Examining Structures
The difficulties in measuring the actual outcomes generated by international courts increase the relative importance of structure indicators (sometimes referred to as "inputs"), and process indicators. Structure indicators may help, by way of "reverse engineering", in evaluating the capacity of international courts to meet their goals.
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They may also help in explaining some of the perceived discrepancies between outcomes and goals. Nonetheless, one must observe that structural indicators are "twice removed" from outputs, and that their actual impact on the latter is mediated by the quality of the process put into place, and affected by a myriad of environmental factors which either facilitate or hinder total goal attainment.  Structural Independence -potential for judicial independence, institutional independence, reputation for impartiality.
 Usage Potential -conditions that may underlie expectations for actual usage (e.g., propensity of member states to litigate, relevance of the problem area addressed by the court).
Another important structural factor is the possibility of transforming judicial structures or procedures in response to changing needs or circumstances. 113 Such transformation may occur, to the extent in which the court is authorized to reform its own structures or procedures, through the exercise of the court's own legal powers, or, more likely, through direct or indirect recourse by the court to the mandate providers pursuant to the aforementioned -chain of delegation‖ theory. In all cases, 110 See Komesar, supra note 4, at 123 (discussing the special attributes of legal structures than may offer courts a comparative advantage over other social institutions for certain purposes). 111 See Young, supra note 24, at 176 (noting the critical importance of transparencyi.e., the monitoring of compliance with governing rules, in assessing the effect of social institutions on individual and collective state behavior). 112 Guzman emphasizes the perceived quality of the judges. Guzman, supra note 5, at 206. While perceptions of quality may be particularly important from a complianceinducing point of view, my approach to effectiveness is broader, and justifies considering objective indicia of judicial quality as well. 113 See Young, supra note 24, at 179 (emphasizing the importance of transformation rules for institutional effectiveness).
the ease in which changes can be made may affect the court's ability to attain its goals.
Finally, a more complete picture of the structural attributes of international courts would emerge after exploring the legal, institutional, political, economic, ideological and cultural environments in which such courts operate, as it appears that the de jure and de facto powers of the court derive, to a large extent, from these background conditions. 114 The differences, for example, between the records of achievement of courts in Europe, as compared to those outside Europe, may appertain as much to the "pro-rule of law" climate found in Europe, as to any intrinsic factor related to the structure of the relevant courts. 
Examining Process
Like structural indicators, examination of the processes employed by international courts may also help us in both understanding court-effectiveness and explaining ineffectiveness and inefficiencies. By assessing the quantity and quality of the effort invested in operating international courts, one may predict the degrees to which some of their goals will be attained (and, as noted with regard to structure, explain why a judicial process was deemed appropriate by the mandate providers). For example, the pace at which proceedings before the court take place may predict to some extent its ability to resolve a large number of disputes, provide normative guidance on a variety of issues, and promote enforcement -i.e., generate relevant outcomes. Likewise, assessing adherence to standards of due process can further contribute to a better understanding of a court's legitimacy in the eyes of certain target audiences, and ultimately the impact of its decisions on relevant constituencies. 116 Still, one should 114 These factors are referred to by Young as exogenous factors governing effectiveness (as opposed to endogenous structural factors). Young, supra note 24, at 176. See also Jacobson and Brown-Weiss, supra note 11, at 7. 115 See Helfer and Slaughter, supra note 5, at 298, 367. See also Young's discussion of government's capacity to govern and distribution of power and inter-dependence among participants in an international regime as factors controlling the effectiveness of institutions striving to influence their conduct (Young, supra note 24, (183) (184) (185) (186) (187) (188) (189) (190) and Jacobson and Brown-Weiss' discussion of the centrality of the international environment and country related factors in assessing the effectiveness of international environmental regimes. See Jacobson and Brown-Weiss, supra note 11, at 528-535. 116 Note that legitimacy may, ultimately, be a subjective notion-Mitchel Lasser, 'Transforming Deliberations', in THE LEGITIMACY OF HIGHEST COURTS acknowledge that an examination of the process may be a sub-optimal proxy for a goal-attainment centered investigation into effectiveness. This is because such an examination is often based on the same incorrect assumptions of the relationship between process and outcomes that are employed by the courts themselves (such as the notion that more prosecutions lead to greater deterrence or that expedited proceedings lead to fewer not more disputes, etc.).
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Some of the relevant social science literature mentions three main categories for evaluating the quality of the judicial process: procedural justice, interpersonal justice, and informational justice. 118 Although such literature focuses on justice and not on effectiveness, the criteria it identifies may serve as a useful starting point for analysis of court effectiveness as well. Procedural justice criteria are concerned with evaluation of the structural aspects of the court procedures 119 -e.g., access to justice, actual usage rates, participation of all the relevant stakeholders in the process, duration of the proceedings, their costs, consistency in the application of procedural rules (similar cases being treated alike, identifying deviations from court procedures), compliance monitoring, and actual judicial independence. Interpersonal justice criteria evaluates the way in which participants in the process are treated (i.e. fair/respectful treatment, etc.). 120 Finally, informational justice refers to the transparency of the process and invites an assessment of the quality of the court's reasoning. Comparisons may also be helpful for measuring fluctuations in the effectiveness of a single judicial institution over time.
Still, at the end of the day, one has to admit that the success prospects of the research agenda introduced here are still unclear. Although application of the insights developed in the social science literature can, no doubt, improve our analytical understanding of international courts and their social functions, and encourage a healthy discussion of the social roles of international courts (which has been often lacking both in theory and practice), whether effectiveness can actually be precisely and comprehensively quantified or meaningfully assessed remains unclear.
